Tuesday, June 26, 2018

I Like Big Bets and I Can Not Lie


There’s a preflop poker strategy that I’ve been seeing again and again this summer during the World Series, and I’m surprised to see it: Preflop raises that amount to five, six, or even eight times the big blind. Sometimes higher. It’s a terrible strategy overall, and I’ll give you a few examples to show why.

During a bracelet event I was playing, blinds were 150/300 with a 25 ante. The player under the gun brought it in for a 2000 raise – a whopping 6.5x big blind raise. After each player unsurprisingly folded (including me), the player triumphantly flipped over pocket Kings, and raked in the smallest amount of chips humanly possible with poker’s second-best starting hand.

This strategy was popular back in the 1980’s and 90’s, and most of the folks using it today are the same ones who used it then – or learned from those who did. (James Woods, for example, plays this way.) In today’s game, such a raise can be intimidating to players who don’t know how to adjust to it. Jeffrey Shulman, coached by Phil Hellmuth, famously used a version of this strategy at the Final Table to finish fifth in the 2009 World Series Main Event. So in the right hands, it can still be effective. But to those of us who know how to counter this style, it’s suicidal. I knocked James Woods out of a Foxwoods tournament a few years ago because I was able to figure out how to play against this strategy. I even blogged about it, if you want to read about it: http://stevessecondpokerblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/playing-poker-with-james-woods.html

Huge preflop raises unnecessarily bloat the pot, committing far more of your stack to the hand than what’s needed, and making it hard to get away when you’re beat. It ensures that you won’t get called except by those hands likely to have you at a serious disadvantage. It rewards you with miniscule pots with hands you’d rather get action with, such as with the pocket Kings example above.

I’ll share another example with you to give you an idea how I play against these opponents, and why this strategy is so disastrous.

In another bracelet tournament, with blinds at 400/800-100 ante, a player in middle position raised to 4400, a massive 5.5x preflop raise that left maybe only 18k behind. Since I’d been playing against this opponent for awhile now, I knew what kind of range he had with this bet: most pairs, any two face cards, and a lot of suited connectors. After the action folded to me on the button, I looked down and saw pocket Jacks.

This hand is going to play quite well against my opponent’s range, but it won’t play well against multiple opponents. I wanted to make sure I was heads-up against this guy; I didn’t want somebody to sneak in holding, say, Ace/Ten and flop perfect. I re-raised to 20k; a sizeable raise, big enough to scare away my remaining opponents while putting the initial raiser all-in if he called.

Mission accomplished. the rest of the field folded; my opponent called off with Ace/King; my hand held; and we had a seat open at our table.

Consider another way to play this hand: Say my opponent opens to 1800, a more reasonable raise that is only small fraction of his overall stack. With my jacks, I’m still going to raise here; probably to something like 4000. When action returns to him, he could either re-raise/shove (and likely win it right there, since I can’t call a four-bet shove with Jacks), or just call behind. Because the money was not that far away at this point, a call might be a better option due to ICM considerations. Since the flop missed my opponent entirely (it was seven-high), he can easily fold to my continuation bet and still have over twenty big blinds remaining. Twenty is better than zero.

I don’t mind it a bit when my opponents overbet preflop. It doesn’t bother me that they can intimidate the other players and build big stacks in the short term. I know how to counter their play, and sooner or later all those chips are going to end up in my stack.

I like big bets and I can not lie.

Friday, November 4, 2016

Pendleton Round-Up November, 2016: Off to a Good Start

Before (r); After (l)
I played my first event Thursday night at the Poker Round-Up. It was a satellite, and I won it (along with around 46 other co-winners). The buy-in was $100 (plus fees), and the payout was a $500 voucher.

Playing a satellite requires a much different playing strategy than a normal freeze-out tournament. The differences are too vast to discuss here, but in general you want to play tighter. Much tighter. Really, really, really tight. After all, if they’re paying 47 players, it won’t matter if you have the largest chip stack or the smallest once the 48th player busts.

A surprising number of satellite players don’t realize this, including a whole bunch of the folks that were playing last night. They just played standard tournament poker (which, for many of them, wasn’t even that skillful to begin with). I’ve played very few satellites in my career, but I’ve been able to cash in around 2/3 of them, which is a decent result. I’d say the average player cashes in around 10-20% of the satellites he or she plays.

One hand in particular for me was a heart-stopper. We were roughly six or eight players away from the cash, and looking at my tiny chipstack, I realized there was no way that I was going to be able to fold my way into the money. I’d have to find a hand somewhere along the way to double up with, or I’d blind all the way out and leave with nothing.

The player on my right had a very large stack and was pushing folks around with it. I knew I was just going to have to take a hand and go with it. Then, it happened. Action folded all the way to the big stack, who was in the small blind (I was the big blind). He glanced at his cards and instantly shoved. I realized that he would do this with an incredibly wide range, and decided that if I had a hand that was better than a 50/50 hand versus something random, I’d have to push it. Say, Queen/Seven offsuit or better.

I looked down at the Queen of clubs/Ten of clubs, an above-average (but not great) hand, and called off my stack. My opponent turned over Seven of diamonds/Three of clubs. I’d have to say that this was probably the bottom of his range.

The flop cards were the Queen of hearts, Three of diamonds, Nine of clubs. So far so good.

Turn: Seven of hearts. Ugh.

River: Ten of diamonds.

Now, I’m normally pretty stoic at the poker table, but I couldn’t resist reacting to this particular run-out. I started yelling, “Suck and Re-suck! Suck and Re-suck!” and then started laughing. The double-up gave me all I needed to sneak into the money and outlast everyone else.


A few hands later, I picked up Ace of Spades/King of Clubs. Although I was tempted, I let it go. I figured I’d already won my voucher, and I didn’t want to screw it up.

Thursday, October 13, 2016

A Not-Terribly-Significant Hand in a $3/$5 Cash Game

I was in a $3/$5 No-Limit game earlier today. I'd been playing a tight game at a loose table, and had worked my $500 stack up to around $700 in two hours of play -- a pretty decent win rate. Then, this hand came up.

I was in the big blind. Action uncharacteristically folded all the way to a player in late position, who limped in for $5. He was a very poor player; he nearly qualified as a calling station. He was playing way too many hands, and generally playing them far too passively to walk away a winner in this game. Everyone else folded to the small blind, who called. I looked down at Queen of diamonds/Three of clubs; a truly dreadful hand. Since folding unfortunately wasn't an option, I merely checked and we went to the flop.

The dealer spread the Ace of clubs, Queen of hearts, Seven of diamonds; so I'd flopped middle pair. The small blind checked. I also checked, allowing the late position player to maintain his momentum. He didn't disappoint, putting out a $15 continuation bet. The small blind folded, and it was back to me.

I gave the matter some thought. Although it was possible that my opponent had paired the Ace, I felt that if he HAD an Ace, he would have come in for a raise preflop rather than just limp in. I'd seen him raise preflop before, so I knew it was the type of play he did. If I couldn't put him on an Ace, I had to call the flop bet. So I did.

The turn brought the Six of hearts. I checked again. The villain put out a $20 bet. I felt I was in the same situation as the previous street, so I called again.

The river was the Ace of spades. I checked again; villain put out $25. It was time for me to think it through some more.

First of all, with two aces on the board, it was now even LESS likely that my opponent also held an ace. There just aren't that many in the deck overall. And his river bet was ridiculously small, given the size of the pot at this point ($85). I was pretty certain now that I held the best hand.

I wondered about maybe putting out a value raise, but this brought its own complications. There's an important concept about river raises: You need to ask yourself, What are the chances my hand is good on those occasions when he CALLS? With this board, I lose to an Ace (of course), Kings, sets, and pretty much any Queen, since my kicker wouldn't play. If I raised, would he call with any hand that I beat? I couldn't imagine that he would. He would call whenever I'm beat, and fold whenever I'm not. So a raise wouldn't really accomplish anything.

I called, and showed my Queen-no-kicker. Villain showed Jack of clubs/Ten of clubs, and I pulled in the pot.

Thursday, July 21, 2016

The Weirdest Hand I’ve Ever Played

I’ve been coming out to Pendleton’s poker tournaments for a few years now, off and on They’re among my favorite to play. I’ve even blogged about them before. So I thought I’d discuss a very weird hand I played here yesterday – probably my weirdest tournament hands ever. It essentially propelled me all the way to the final table.

The Wildhorse Casino hosts three big tournament series each year (in April, July, and November), called either the “Poker Round-Up” or the “Poker Rodeo”, depending on the time of the year. They are, without a doubt, the premier poker event in the Northwest, and hundreds of players descend on this tiny town from as far away as Reno, San Francisco, and Seattle.

Although I’ve been to plenty of the Spring and Fall events over the past several years, this is the first time I’ve gone to their Summer event. It’s a much smaller scale, and the crowd (I’ve discovered) is much more local … and, more importantly, less-skilled.

This particular tournament (“Event #1”) started with each player getting 10,000 in chips. Each level lasted thirty minutes, and there was a break every three levels. During the first three levels, nothing very significant happened at my table. I won some small pots and lost some small pots, and headed into the first break with a stack slightly below the 10k I started with. No big deal; during those early levels that sort of deficit isn’t too difficult to recover from.

Once I got back from break, though, I went on a massive heater. With levels at 100/200 with a 25 ante, the player under the gun raised to 600. It was folded all the way around to me in the big blind. I had a decent enough hand: 9c 9s. It’s certainly worth playing, and since I was already getting a discount (being in the blind), I tossed 400 in for a call.

The flop was absolutely perfect: Ah Kd 9d. I had a set on a board that almost certainly hit her hand. I checked, preparing a check raise. But I didn’t get the chance, because she pushed all-in! I happily called, saw that she held Ah Jd, and won the pot when the rest of the board cards bricked. Since I had her covered (slightly), she was out of the tournament … and I was nearly doubled-up. Sweet.

A few hands later, a player under-the-gun shoved his small stack. I was in the cutoff with (déjà vu!) 9c 9h, and called. It was heads up. He showed Ac Kh, the board didn’t help, and I’d busted my second victim in less than one button orbit.

At this point, I definitely had some chirping chips. I started stealing some small pots and leaning on my opponents with big bets, and built my stack up to around 60k – around three times the average stack size at the time.

Then, the big hand came up. I mean, big big hand.

With levels at 400/800 and 100 ante, the player second to act (UTG+1) opened with a raise to around 1800. Action folded to a lady in middle position who had a short stack. She pushed all-in for about 10,000. The next player to act was a rather unsophisticated player on my right (late position, or “LP”). He thought and thought for a long time, and then called. I was next up, on the button. I looked down at Ad Kh and thought about how to play it:
·       If one of my opponents had either Aces or Kings, my hand is in very bad shape. Against any other pair, my odds are just slightly under 50/50. And against any hand that’s not a pair, my chances of winning start at around 60% and go up from there.
·       I didn’t put the guy on my right on Aces or Kings. He was having a tough time deciding what to do, and I thought it was because he had a hand other than those.
·       The lady who shoved? It was very possible that she had one of those pairs. But if so, and if she wins, I’m only out around 10k and still have a monstrously huge stack to keep playing with.
·       What about the opener? He was a young kid who’d just lost a pot earlier. Was he on tilt? Was he any good? I had a really tough time reading him. I had to make my decision without having much input there.

Although I briefly considered it, I decided that I wasn’t going to fold. It came down to whether I should just call, or re-raise and try to isolate one of the other two players. I didn’t see any advantage to isolating; I kind of wanted the guy on my right in the hand so I could win a post-flop side pot if in fact the shover did have Aces or Kings. So, I just called.

Next up was the player in the small blind. He also shoved, but since he only had around 8k he was all-in for less. He seemed a bit resigned at this point, and I thought he wasn’t particularly enthusiastic with his hand.

Action went back to the original raiser, who was now facing a re-raise to around 10k. He decided to shove himself, which was around 25k.

Now, back to the guy on my right. He had the UTG+1 player covered, but not by much. He hemmed and hawed for a long time, and then called the re-raise.

I was next up, to call the 25k re-raise. Wow, a lot of action in this hand! I figured I was probably beat somewhere along the line, but maybe I could still snag a side pot. I went ahead and re-shoved myself, hoping at least I could get the guy on my right to call. Since he was already nearly all-in, it wasn’t much more for him, so he called off.

It took probably three minutes for the dealer to assemble the three side pots! So, in total, we were fighting over four total pots:
·       The main pot held around 40k, and all five players were in that one.
·       The first side pot had around 8k, and everybody except the small blind were in that one.
·       The second side pot had around 45k, and the UTG+1, LP player, and I were in that one.
·       The final side pot had maybe 5k, and only me and the LP guy were in that one.

Then, we all turned over our cards. Here’s what we all held (in order of smallest to largest stacks):
·       The shortest stack, the small blind, had Tc Ts.
·       The lady who went all-in had Ks Kc. She was looking very happy.
·       The UTG+1 player had As Qc. He was drawing nearly dead.
·       The LP guy on my right had 8h 8c.
·       And me, your humble hero, with Ad Kh.

The board cards came out 6d 5c 9d. The guy with eights now had a straight draw. The turn was the 3h. Even at that point, except for the UTG+1 player we were all still alive for the main pot. Then, the dealer gave us the river.

It was the Ace of Hearts.

I’d won it all. Every chip. I was completely stunned. I could barely move. I’d knocked out four players in one hand. I suddenly had over 100k in chips sitting in front of me. I didn’t even have enough room to stack them all. Since there were only five players still at our table, they had to suspend play until they could fill it back up (which was very fortunate, because it gave me a chance to start the epic job of stacking all those chips). Ultimately, the TD bought two racks of my smallest chip denominations (the 100s) and brought over some 5k chips – which weren’t even supposed to be in play until after the next break!


Anyhow, I rode that massive chip advantage all the way to the final table. I think I played above average, but (as you can see) I also got hit by the deck pretty hard. But that’s how you win tournaments. Or, at least in my case, run really really deep in them!

Monday, March 7, 2016

Maximum Value at a Short-Stacked Cash Game

The $2/$5 No-Limit cash game at Snoqualmie has one very interesting anomaly: The maximum buy-in is limited to only $300. This has implications for how one should play this game. For example, say you’re on the button at a full ring game. A player in middle position raises to $15. Action folds to you, and you look down at 97s. If effective stacks were, say, $1000, this hand would definitely be worth playing (and might even merit a re-raise). But with only $300 behind, this hand hits the muck. There just isn’t enough implied odds to make such a speculative holding worthwhile.

Given that context, the following hand came up, and I’m pretty sure I got maximum value from it.

The player under-the-gun raised to $15. By the time action got to me in the small blind, three callers had come along for the ride. This, by the way, is another hallmark of this game; lots of preflop limpers and callers, which again has implications for how one should play certain hands.

I looked down at AcQc – a premium hand for this situation, for sure. I saw that there was $67 in dead money in the pot, and decided that was a big enough number of chips to try to take right there. I also realized that if anyone called (and the initial caller was the one most likely to do so), my hand had plenty of post-flop equity to continue on with. I decided to raise to $80. The big blind folded, and action returned to the preflop raiser.

I could tell from his reaction that he thought I was just trying to steal the pot. As the table sheriff, he wasn’t going to let me get away with it. He smooth called; everyone else folded, and we took the flop heads-up.

The flop came 4c 2c 7d. So I had flopped the nut flush draw; a backdoor draw to the idiot end of a straight; and I had two overcards. Overall, I was likely way ahead. Even if my opponent had something like pocket tens or Jacks, I was over 50% to win. Only a flopped set had me in trouble. If ever a flop called out for a c-bet, this was it.

I checked.

In doing so, I tried to look as weak and as disappointed as I could. After all, my opponent appeared convinced that I was merely on a steal; I was hoping that by feigning weakness I could induce him to bluff. And he did.

He pushed all-in, which (given the starting stacks) was only around $200. I nearly beat him into the pot, and immediately flipped my hand face-up for all to see. No slow-rolling for me!

The dealer completed the board with the 5h and the 2d. In other words, I had completely missed everything, and ended the hand with a measly Ace-high.

My opponent looked at the board, and slowly mucked his hand. My Ace-high was winner. I can only assume that he had a hand like King/Queen or King/Jack – hands far too weak to open under the gun, at least for me.


If I’d bet the flop with a c-bet, I’m pretty sure he’d wiggled off the hook. But my weak check gave him the green light to try to push me off the hand. Sadly for him, I had the near nuts. I wasn’t going anywhere.

Monday, February 15, 2016

Heartland Poker Tour Seniors Event Championship


That’s my ending chipstack … how it looked after I knocked out the #3 player on the way to heads-up. My JsJc held up against her Ad7h. At that point, both the last remaining player (Gregg) and I had roughly the same size stack (around 1.3 million), so we agreed to a 50/50 chop. I actually had just a little bit more than he did, so I became listed as the champion for that event. The tournament had 173 players; paid 18; and cost $200 to enter. Gregg and I walked away with a little over $6500 each. Hmm, $500+ per hour for twelve hours’ work? Not bad I’d say.

I think I got the better end of that bargain. Gregg had been running over every table he’d played at – including mine early on, before I was mercifully moved away – and I wasn’t eager to play heads-up against him. Although the two of us butted heads infrequently, the number of hands he won against me and the number I won against him were about the same. I’m probably the only one who could say that about him, and he’s probably the only one who could say the same thing about me. So a 50/50 chop seemed like an appropriate way to wind up the game.

I don’t really have a narrative for this entry beyond what I’ve said above, so I’ll just post some random, admittedly rather jumbled comments.

·       It seemed like there were a lot of women players at this event, and most of them were pretty good. Every table I was at, including the final table, had three or four ladies at it.
·       I spent a LOT of time as the chip leader at whichever table I was at. When I wasn’t leading, I was nearly always above average stack. It wasn’t the result of very many big hands (although I certainly did have many big hands). It was more the result of just slow, steady, consistent grinding. I think I was only all-in twice, and both times early on in the tournament.
·       One time I went all-in against another player who had me just barely covered. I won the hand, and he was down to a single chip!
·       I think I knocked out around ten players overall, which is a lot. I knocked out three players in one hand, taking KK against AQ, QQ, and 66.
·       Early in the tournament, I raised in middle position with A9o. It folded to the small blind, who had a somewhat short stack, and he shoved. After thinking it over for a while, I called (it wasn’t that many more chips). He showed 4h2h. My Ace held up, and he was busted. The guy sitting next to me, who was pretty much a jerk, said, “When did Ace/Nine become a raising hand?” I said, “The same day Four/Deuce became a shoving hand.” He had a lot more commentary on how badly I was playing overall. I just said, “Yes, you’re right, I am a really bad player.” He busted out soon afterwards.
·       I did not deliver a single bad beat the entire tournament. That is astonishing. Every time I won a hand at showdown, it was because it started out being the better hand (at least post-flop). I certainly suffered some soul-crushing bad beats myself though! Once my Aces were cracked on the river for two pair (we were all-in on the turn). Another time, my Ace/King was beat by Ace/Six when my opponent rivered a Ten-high straight. This was by the same lady that went all the way to #3 (who I busted later). But I had so many chips that I was able to survive both of these setbacks.
·       Another notable hand happened at the final table. This player with a very swingy playing style (she was always involved in massive pots with marginal hands, which she sometimes won) went all-in in early position. I was in late position with Aces and called. (There's no better feeling than when someone shoves into your Aces.) She had AQo and busted. What made this hand notable (to me) is that I think it was a mistake for her to shove with Ace/Queen offsuit. First of all, she just had way too many chips. A smaller raise would have made more sense, and been appropriate. But also, AQo just isn’t a good shoving hand from early position at a full table, unless you are desperately short-stacked. Again, she should have just raised.
·       When facing all-in bets, I folded 55 twice, 99, and AQo. The AQ fold was against the same player who busted #3; I was probably actually ahead of her range but didn’t want to get involved. The very next hand, I shoved with AJo and won. The point here is that you need a much better hand to call a shove than you do to shove yourself.


After I won (it was around 1am), I was so excited that I couldn’t sleep. This morning, I’m exhausted. I have another tournament that starts in a couple of hours though, and I really want to play it, so hopefully I can keep it together long enough to run well. It should only go about three or four hours, so I should be okay.

Tuesday, November 24, 2015

That Was One Weird Hand



I recently played a session of $3/$5 no-limit at Muckleshoot, and ended up winning a hand I had no business winning (and, arguably, no business being in). It ended in a most bizarre way; providing me with an experience I’d never had before.

I was on the button in this hand. By the time action got to me, there were four limpers. I looked down to see 4h4d, the hand nicknamed “Barack Obama” (since he is the 44th President). There were a few ways I could play this hand:

·       I could fold. However, even though this is such a small pair, I just couldn’t bring myself to make such a wimpy play. The opportunity to flop a set and double my chipstack (or more) was just too enticing.
·       A raise might be in order. However it would probably have to be on the order of a $35-$40 raise to clear away the deadwood, and from playing at this table I realized I wouldn’t be able to shake all of my opponents. A low pair is good for winning a pot preflop; but once the board cards start coming one generally loses.
·       I decided to go with the third option; the smooth call. This gave me the chance for a big score, while risking a minimum of chips.

Action moved on to the small blind. He actually DID take the opportunity to raise, to $40. He was a younger guy; extremely aggressive, but no maniac. It was tough having him on my left, and I knew whenever he was in a hand I would need to be extremely alert.

The big blind folded, and all the limpers called (this was precisely why I had decided not to raise). By the time action got back to me, there was a little over $200 in the pot, and I was being asked to commit another $35. I found these odds irresistible; and as I was closing the action, I decided to call.

The flop came Qh As Qd. At that point, I was done with my hand. I had failed to flop my set, and with such a dangerous board I just wanted to move on to the next hand. However, everyone mysteriously checked this flop; so I checked as well and bought a free card on the turn.

As an aside, the only opponent I was really paying attention to was the preflop raiser on my left, who was the first to act. When he checked the flop, I took all the hands which had an Ace or a Queen out of his range. Given his terrible position and such a dangerous board, I would have expected him to bet these hands if he had them (I know I certainly would have). When he didn’t, I realized he didn’t have those hands.

Things got worse on the turn, with the Jd coming. But once again, it was checked all the way around. I decided to remove Jacks and King/Ten from my opponent’s range, as these are hands he would be obliged to bet with such a scary board and myriad opponents.

The river card was the Jh. Now, the preflop aggressor suddenly came alive, betting $60 into this pot of nearly $250. All the field insta-folded, except for me. I decided to think it over for a bit.

I had already removed so many hands from my opponent’s range, what was left for him to value bet on this river? Pocket Kings? I suppose a monster hand such as quad Queens or Aces full. Or perhaps I had my ranging wrong; but I really didn’t think so. Aside from Kings, I couldn’t put him on a hand that beat the board. And his bet was so small, it was hard to take seriously as a value bet. So I called.

Almost immediately, a number of things happened in somewhat rapid succession:

1.       My opponent said, “You’re good,” and picked up his cards, preparing to helicopter them into the muck.
2.       I turned my pocket fours face up.
3.       My opponent mucked his hand, and the dealer immediately buried it.
4.       I said, “I play the board.”
5.       The dealer pushed me the entire pot.
6.       My opponent realized he’d mucked a tying hand.

And that, boys and girls, is how I won a pot of nearly $400 that I never should have.


The only thing that made this experience better was what actually happened: My opponent started to berate me for my call, enumerating all of the winning hands he could have had (which also happened to be all the hands I had removed from his range as the hand played out). The only reply I gave was, “I know. I’m a really bad player.” And I have all of your chips. It took me three hands to stack them all.

Sunday, November 8, 2015

How a Poker Player Thinks



I’ve been spending this week playing at the Ameristar in St. Louis. I’ve been playing nearly all of the Heartland Poker Tour events (including the Main Event), but also plenty of cash games. These games are among the juiciest I’ve ever seen. Outside of Aruba and the Florida rooms, I can’t recall anyplace I’ve played where the chips came so easy. Here’s one hand as an example:

This was a 1/3 game. Having started with $300, I’d been able to grind it up to around $400 after a half-hour ($395 to be precise – see below to learn how I came to know that).  Lots of limping taking place; it wasn’t at all uncommon for six players to see a flop. This isn’t to say there wasn’t ANY preflop raising; on two occasions someone raised $100 into a pot with a few limpers. Both times, after everyone folded, they tabled pocket Kings face-up. Everybody respectfully and solemnly congratulated the winner on their immense skill and judgment for how they avoided a potentially dangerous flop. I felt like congratulating them on winning the absolute smallest amount of money humanly possible with poker’s second-best starting hand.

The following hand happened while I was in middle position. By the time action got to me, we’d seen two limpers (including the older player on my right). I looked down to see pocket nines, and raised to $15. I’d been raising every pot I entered regardless of the number of limpers, which threw some of the other players off since it was so unusual. Not that it made that much difference; my preflop raises didn’t get much respect, and I knew I’d have to trust my post-flop game to be successful in this room.

My raise got cold-called in two spots behind me. The small blind folded; big blind called; and the first limper also called. Now action was on the player to my right. To recap: Four players plus me, with one left to act.

Suddenly, this player shoved all-in; nearly a $400 re-raise.

My first instinct was to fold. After all, pocket nines generally don’t play well in a hand that’s been three-bet preflop. But I decided to give the matter a bit more thought. I asked myself, what hand would someone limp/shove with … that could beat pocket nines?

We’ve already established that folks will raise preflop with premium hands at this table. This means that my opponent probably didn’t have Aces, Kings, Queens, or Jacks, because he would have raised with them himself. Maybe even Tens. So what hand would he reraise-shove with? Let’s say Tens, Nines, Eights, Sevens, and maybe Sixes. Against this range, 99 is a 65/35 winner. So I should call.

Let’s add a few more hands to his range. Assuming he’d also raise AK and AQ, that removes those hands from his range. So maybe AJs and ATs … KQs, QJs, and JTs. I can’t think of any other reasonable possibilities, and even these might be stretching it. But even so, I’m still 60/40 against this range.

Again, the key for me was his limp/shove, and what preflop raises tended to mean at this table. If he’d raised a reasonable amount himself preflop, I’d have just called (and given the exact flop, bluffed if checked to or folded to a bet). If he’d three-bet a smaller amount, I might have folded. But his shove, paradoxically, just looked too weak, and WAY too polarizing.

I called.


Everyone else folded, so it was heads up. The board cards were KKQJ4 rainbow. I showed my 99; he showed 77; and since I had him outchipped by around $5 (that’s how I knew exactly how much I had above), he was completely felted. I stacked towers of chips, while he rebought.

Sunday, September 20, 2015

THIS …. (drum roll) … IS THE HPT.

I spent this past week in lovely Reno, Nevada playing my very first HPT tournament at the Grand Sierra. I’ve played here (and stayed here) before, done well, and had high hopes. Sadly, I finished out of the money, but it was a good experience nevertheless.

The Main Event was a $1650 buy-in, and the stars were definitely out. They had three starting flights, and I played the first one. The pros in the field included Howard “Tahoe” Andrew (on my left); Pendleton triple-crown winner Angela Jordison (on my right); Dutch Boyd; and 2015 November Niner Neil Blumenfield.

As is usually the case, my bust-out hand was rather inconsequential. I pushed AhQd against KK and lost. It was a previous hand which was actually the key hand. Losing it knocked my chipstack down to under 25BB, giving me considerably less maneuverability and preventing me from being a factor in the game.

With blinds of 250/500 and 50 ante, I was on the button and after several hours of solid grinding was one of the overall chip leaders with roughly 60k. The player under-the-gun limped in. He was a passive player, frequently limped, and quite honestly was what one would refer to as a calling station. He was way out of his league against these players, and if he hadn’t already hit a few miracle board cards he would have been long gone. As it was, he started the hand with around 40k in chips.

Cary Marshall was in middle position with the smallest stack at the table of around 10k, and he limped behind. He’s an older player; tighter than average and very tough. He had knocked me out of a previous tournament (which he went on to win), and I definitely did NOT like seeing him at my table. He’d lost a bunch of chips in a couple of bad beats, but I’d seen him grind it back up before and knew he was just as dangerous now as he was when he was chip leader.

The next player was Ian Steinman, a 25-year old pro from the Bay area. He had around 20k. He had a good, solid game; a bit on the loose side, but definitely good competition for this field. He thought about his action for a bit, and then raised it to 2.5k.

It folded to me, and I looked down to see AsKs. I thought carefully about what I wanted to do with this hand. Folding was out of the question. Should I raise to thin the field, or just call behind to see if I can encourage some additional players? AK suited plays well against many opponents, so I decided to just smooth-call and see if I could get more folks into the pot.

Everyone else folded back to the UTG limper, who also called (as I totally expected him to). Then Cary was next. He shoved all-in for a total of 10k. Ian thought about what do to next; it was pretty clear that he didn’t expect to see so much action on top of his raise. Finally, he folded. He told me later that he had Ace/Jack offsuit.

I was next, and once again I was facing the same question: Re-raise to (likely) get heads-up against Cary, or just call and let the UTG player tag along? I really felt that I had a premium holding, and getting as many chips as possible is so important in a tournament, so I went with the call. I felt that if I missed the flop completely, I could just release if I came under pressure. UTG called also, so it was three players to the flop (one all-in).

The flop came Kh 8d 3d. Immediately, UTG shoved all-in for his remaining chips (around 40k total). I knew instantly exactly what he had. When a player acts quickly, it almost always means that he is on a draw. If UTG had a set or some other big holding, he’d have thought about how to play it for a bit before acting. I was convinced that I was ahead, so I called without much delay.

Sure enough, UTG had 9d 6d. Cary had Kc Qs and was drawing nearly dead. I had a huge lock on the hand. The turn card was a brick, but the river was … another diamond. Cary was knocked out of the tournament and I lost over half of my chipstack and was nearly crippled.

I’ve given this hand quite a bit of thought, and here’s what I’ve concluded:

I really don’t like the way Cary played this hand. King/Queen offsuit is not a good preflop holding -- as this hand makes obvious; he was completely dominated. He hit top pair and was still behind. He should have folded and waited for another opportunity.

On the other hand, I really like Ian’s play. He took a stab at the pot with a good hand, and then released once he realized that he was beat. I can’t fault his play at all.

At first, I really didn’t like UTG’s flop shove. I thought it was way too spewy, and he’s only called when he’s behind, such as with this hand. But after thinking about it some more, maybe this judgment is a bit harsh. Although he’s behind, the pot is laying him pretty much the correct odds to make a play like this. I still think it goes against ICM strategy, but mathematically it’s not a disaster. On the other hand, deciding to play 9/6 suited under the gun is not the kind of thing I would do.


So that leaves my play. The only adjustment I could reasonably have made at some point pre-flop would have been to re-raise (or over-shove) rather than just call. But I think the preflop call, overall, is going to have a higher +EV than those alternatives. (At no time did I consider a fold.)

Friday, July 31, 2015

Using Tells ... Reverse tells, that is!

The way I define a poker tell is: A detectable reaction your opponent has when they realize what their hand is. Tells can be subtle (a momentary pupil dilation when another player likes what he sees); or profound (a heavy sigh and headshake, followed by a huge bet … which indicates a monster hand). But most poker-playing tell experts will admit that much of the time there’s a can’t-quite-put-my-finger-on-it quality to detecting tells. The immortal Doyle Brunson says that evolution has provided us with this skill; it kept our caveman-era ancestors from wandering into the wrong place where a bear was waiting to devour them. (Given his age, perhaps he knows this firsthand.) You ignore these hunches at your own peril.

Detecting tells is a valuable skill to have. Numerous books have been written on it. But giving off false tells can be even more useful … if your audience is attentive, and can process what they’re seeing.

I was playing a $3/$5 cash game and had around $700 in front of me. The table was pretty passive preflop, with lots of limpers and callers seeing every flop. This hand was no different. I was in the big blind. The player on my left (who was first to act) had a stack of around $400. He led out with a raise for $20. It was a bit unusual to see a preflop raise in this table; but what happened next wasn't at all unusual, which was watching five other players call. I looked down at the KsTd. I had a $5 chip already in play, so it would only cost me $15 more to enter a pot that had $125 in it. King/Ten offsuit is not a good hand, but the pot odds were irresistible. I tossed in three more red chips, and seven of us saw the flop.

The dealer spread As Qd 9h. I had a gutshot straight draw, but I couldn’t see going any further with this hand if the flop was bet into. The small blind checked, and I checked behind. The next player to act, the one on my left, was the initial raiser. He put together a handful of chips as if to bet … but at the last minute, he checked also. The rest of the table also checked, so we got to see a free turn card.

Yahtzee! The turn was the Jc, so now I had the nut straight. This time after the small blind checked, I assembled a bet of around $75 and slid it across the bet line. Now, the UTG player came alive, raising my bet to $175. The remaining field quickly folded, and action was back to me.

I had the nut hand. There was no flush possibility. I was ahead of every other possible holding. My only risk was if my opponent had a set or two pair, he could fill up on the river. I saw that my opponent only had around $250 left behind, so I went ahead and put him all-in.

My opponent tanked. He knew he was dead to a ten (unless he had one too). Did I have one? He was trying to figure that out.

Then I went into acting mode. I took my hand and put it over my mouth. Tell experts will say that players will do this when they are bluffing. Bluffing, after all, is a form of lying. Humans aren’t hard-wired to lie. So a mouth-to-the-hand gesture is sort of saying, “I just said something that wasn’t true. Don’t ask me to say it again.”

I followed this up by gently rubbing the side of my head. Again, another strong tell. When players are nervous, they will “hug” themselves as a way of making themselves feel better. I’ve seen opponents rub the back of their neck, their shoulder, even their arm. They do it when they’re weak, and worried about what might happen next.

My opponent tripped all over himself calling my shove. I turned over my straight, and he turned over Ad Qs, for top two pair. The river was a brick, and my opponent was down to the felt, and reaching into his wallet for a re-buy. I’m convinced it was my acting job that earned the call.


The only other comment to make about this had has to do with the player’s flop check. Clearly, it was a huge mistake. He started to assemble a bet with his top two pair, but at the last minute checked, obviously hoping for the opportunity of a check-raise. It didn’t happen, and he gave away any chance of taking down the pot. Had he bet, I would have folded. Lesson: Don’t slowplay your monster hands out of position.

Saturday, April 18, 2015

Reflections on Pendleton’s Spring Poker Rodeo



Poker is a game of skill. It is not gambling – at least, if you define the term “gambling” the same way I do. “Gambling” is putting money at risk when you have absolutely no influence on the outcome. Craps is gambling. Lotto is gambling. So is sports betting, roulette, slots, and just about everything else in the casino. That’s why whenever I enter a casino, I pass by all those tables and loud machines without even a glance and head straight to the card room, and I stay there until it’s time to leave.

Poker is a game of skill. Want proof?

Allow me to introduce you to Angela Jordison. Angela won the very first poker tournament held here this particular season. Now, there were 537 entrants in that tournament, and so for Angela to win (assuming poker is all luck and no skill), the chances of this happening would be 1 in 537 or a little less than two-tenths of one percent (0.2%). Not bad, huh? But also no big deal. After all, somebody has to win that game.

The next day, Angela entered the second tournament of the series. There were 448 players, and … Angela won that one too.

Wait a minute … the odds of the same person winning two tournaments in a row? Again, assuming it was all luck and no skill, that would be (1/537) * (1/448) or … four ten-thousands of one percent.

But Angela wasn't done. The next day, she entered the third tournament, which had 214 total players. You probably know where this is going. Yep, she won that one too. Three tournaments, three wins, one winner. That drops the odds of this happening randomly to less than two one-millionths of one percent. And that’s a mighty small number.

Just as an aside … she was on my direct right in another tournament (not one of these three), and she was without a doubt an excellent player. She came to my table with substantially fewer chips than I had, and was still there long after I had busted out.

This is one of the biggest accomplishments of this type that I can think of, and it happened because poker is a game of skill, and Angela was one of the very best players in that room.



It goes without saying that I played a lot of poker this week while I was out in Pendleton. Far more hours at the tournament tables than the cash games (and I scored one cash in the four tourneys that I played). There are quite a few hands that are memorable to me, most of which I played really well, including some that I lost. But I think this particular hand stood out for me.

It was fairly early in the tournament. Three players were in the hand, and the effective stack sizes were about 15,000 chips. Blinds were 200/400, and there weren't any antes being collected yet. A young aggressive player who was pretty good (although a little loose) opened the hand in middle position with a raise to 900. I was on the button with the Ten of clubs/Ten of hearts, and just called. Sometimes I would raise with a hand this good, but having watched this player for a while I realized that it wasn't likely I’d get him to fold out, and I didn't want to bloat the pot preflop only to have to release it later. Basically, I was playing to set mine, and willing to drop the hand if I missed. The big blind called the raise, so we went three to the flop with a pot of 2900 and stacks of around 14k.

The flop was Ace/hearts, Ten/diamonds, Three/diamonds. So I flopped middle set on a wet ace-high board.

I looked over at the big blind, and I could see that for some reason he had a tough decision on his hands. He was an older player who had not gotten out of line, so I was intrigued by his hesitation. Finally after some delay, he merely checked.

The initial raiser followed up with a bet of 1500 chips, around half-pot size. I expected him to have an Ace much of the time, and if he did I thought he might call a raise. But I decided to check instead, because I thought maybe the big blind might raise himself given his odd behavior, and I’d be happy to have those chips in the pot too. But much to my surprise, he folded. So the pot was at 5900 and our stacks were at 12.5k.

The turn was the Ace of diamonds. This brought the diamond flush on the board, but also a full house for me. At this point, my opponent checked.

Now I re-evaluated his hand range. While an Ace was still a possibility, given that there were now two on the board, it seemed less likely. I also couldn't put him on the flush. I considered that he probably had a high pair himself, or perhaps an Ace that he didn't want to bet because he thought he might scare me off whatever it was I had. I couldn't see myself getting any more of his chips with a bet at this point unless he had that Ace, so I just checked behind.

The river was Jack/hearts. The villain put out a smallish, 3000-chip bet. I decided to raise it to 8000 from my 12k stack. A shove just seemed too much here, and what I was hoping for was that he would shove on me instead with his Ace (or, less likely, his flush). But instead, he folded his pocket Kings face up, congratulating me on slow-playing my Ace/rag.

I just thanked him warmly, and collected the chips.



I didn't play a lot of cash games this trip, but I did play some. I helped open up a new 2/5 table which became populated by folks who (like me) had dropped out of the tournament rather early on. More than a few of these players were tilted, willing to sling a lot of chips around in an attempt to win back the entry fee of the tournament they’d just busted out of.

As luck would have it (and not particularly good luck), the three players on my immediate left were all extremely loose players. They seemed to make every bet in increments of $100 … or more. And they tended to tangle with each other more than the rest of the table, which was fine with me (and also entertaining). Since I've been around the poker room a time or two, I've learned how to play back at players like this. So I just nitted it up to maximum, and played pretty much nothing at all. Every hand had a raise, every raise had a re-raise, and frequently all this was preceded by a straddle which bloated the pot even further. The only hands I played were pocket Aces, pocket Queens, once pocket Eights which flopped a set, and maybe an Ace/King or Ace/Queen. I actually busted the guy on my left; and the guy on his left at one point asked me, “Haven’t you lost a hand yet?” I replied, “I only want to play those hands that I am going to win,” which actually was fairly accurate. After a brief four-hour session, I’d won more money than I had in a month at my last job.

Poker is a game of skill. And on top of that, it’s fun.

Monday, March 2, 2015

Some Recent, Random Experiences from the Table

We've all seen them; those hyper-aggressive players that bomb the pot on every street, frequently winning a hand by doing nothing more than bullying the opposition out of the way. And we just know that they can’t have a real hand every time they do this; but whenever we try to fight back, we discover that (at least that particular time) they in fact do; alternately, we chicken out before we get to the river.

These players used to befuddle – if not downright intimidate – me, but nowadays I know how to fight back effectively.

It was early afternoon, and my opponent had been playing all night long. He had a stack of nearly $10,000; a respectable showing in a 3/5 game when the max buy-in is only $500. And he was one of these hyper-aggros. Helpfully, he was in Seat 1 and I had Seat 4, so I at least had position on him. I pegged him right away for who he was (his gigantic chip stacks were something of a clue), and assembled a strategy for how to play against him, should the occasion arise.

For the most part, we stayed out of each other’s way. When he came into a pot, I’d generally get out; and if he passed on a hand, I found myself more likely to stay in. But inevitably, the big confrontation took place … and I was ready for it.

I was in the big blind, and he was in the cutoff. This being a Seattle room, the field limped in with hardly any folders, until it got to Aggroboy. He tossed in a huge two-fisted raise, and it was folded to me. I looked down at a pair of black sixes, and thought, what the heck? This was, after all, exactly the kind of hand I was looking to go to war with. I called, the rest of the table folded, and it was heads-up.

The rainbow flop came Ace, Queen … Six. Precisely the kind of hand to hit the Villain’s range, and of course I had just struck Yahtzee. I meekly checked. Villain cut out a monster, pot-sized bet. I hemmed and hawed, and eventually called.

The turn was a three, completing the rainbow. Once more I checked. Once more, Villain bombed the pot. Once more, I hemmed and hawed and called.

The river was a seven, and now was the time to drop the hammer. After a brief, respectable delay, I softly said, “All in” while tossing in a single white chip, and waited. Villain visibly melted. He knew exactly what was up now. However, he also knew that he just had to call; he’d watched me playing for some time now, and he realized that the river bluff was part of my repertoire. His Ace-Jack was no match for my flopped set.

While I was stacking my double-up, I saw that he was muttering to himself. Not in a mean way; he was primarily beating himself up over how he played his hand. Then, just slightly louder, he said, “Well, you hit your hand and just sat back and let me bet it for you.” I said, “Yep, I appreciate that.”

He ended up moving to Seat 6 as soon as the opportunity arose, so that my positional advantage would no longer be there … but by then, the damage had been done.

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Different day, different players.

I was at a table blessed with a textbook fish; a rich noob with a bottomless supply of $100 bills, giving away stacks of chips at a time to whoever happened to be in a hand with him, and happily rebuying whenever he hit felt.

The player on my left, on the other hand, was quite good; and ultimately found himself heads-up against our generous Villain. The Hero had turned two pair, and shoved all in. Villain called with his flush draw, and had at most seven outs (roughly a 15% chance to win the hand). As sometimes happens with really bad players, Villain hit his hand on the river and doubled up. Once the hand ended, as my neighbor was cutting out the chips he needed to make the pot right, he said (only half-joking), “I hate you. You know that right? I mean, I really hate you.”

This got some chuckles from the rest of us at the table, so he continued: “I mean, if you got hit by a truck on the way out of the card room, I wouldn't miss you.” I very quickly chimed in, “Well I would!” This brought more laughter from the rest of the table.


Poker humor. You either get it, or you don’t.

Tuesday, January 27, 2015

Poker in the Caribbean

It was not a surprise to discover that the poker room, while an integral part of the casino, was completely vacant for most of the day. Although the Hollywood Casino, right on the campus of the Simpson Bay Resort on Dutch Sint Maarten, opened its doors each day at 1pm (more or less), there wasn't a soul to be found anywhere near the four baize-topped tables until after the dinner hour had passed. Sometime after sundown, a sign-up list appeared on a clipboard atop one of those tables, along with a pen, inviting would-be rounders to indicate their interest by adding their name. The pre-printed data on the form promised that the $2/$5 game would begin “around 9pm”, and only required a minimum buy-in of $100, with no maximum. I added my name next to the Seat Two line, and since Seat One was already claimed by a punter named “Steve”, I signed as “Devo” – my college nickname – to  identify myself more uniquely.

At precisely 2100 hours I dutifully returned to the site of my upcoming triumph … to discover that it was still vacant. (“Island Time” is the term I came up with to describe the punctuality of the St. Maarten residents.) A subsequent visit fifteen minutes later was only slightly more fruitful; a terminally bored dealer had materialized, sitting behind three full chip racks (one each for $1, $5, and $25 chips). Arrayed around the remaining circumference of the table were three would-be players, looking equally bored. I joined them to become the fourth.

The next fifteen minutes I spent amiably chatting with the lady in Seat Five (Angela from Chicago, so it emerged). A fifth player then grabbed a seat, and as this was apparently the magic number, the dealer and her floor manager began buying our American currency, exchanging it for the equivalent in clay-composite chips, and we were shortly underway. Most folks, including me, considered $300 to be sufficient ammunition for the battles to come.

As I anticipated, actually getting the cards into the air served as the siren call for the rest of the players to join us. At 51, I was clearly one of the youngest at the table; it soon became equally clear that I was the best.

The aforementioned “Steve”, at Seat One, turned out to be a rather chunky guy, laden down with gold jewelry to a point just this side of tacky. He was accompanied by a varied posse of attendants who came and went throughout the evening. He was not left alone for a single moment, conversing with one companion after another throughout his entire time at the table occasionally slipping into some Slavic language (Greek? Croatian?). I pegged him as a big drug dealer; perhaps mafia. Contrary to the rest of us, he bought in $1000 at a time, proceeding to give it all away on a consistent basis.

Steve quite literally played every hand dealt to him. Regardless of whether a pot had been raised (or even re-raised) ahead of him pre-flop, or if he was the tenth limper, he had to see every flop. It goes without saying that this is what led to his disastrous results (of which he seemed quite oblivious). But what I found annoying about his style was the pace of his play. Each action on every street required excruciating deliberation. He’d look at his cards; cut them several times; look at them once more (his thumb flipping their corners with a satisfying “fwap”); cap them with a chip; count the rest of his chipstack; cut out calling chips; cut out raising chips; study the board cards carefully; reassemble his chipstack and look at his cards again …

But worse than that; the rest of the table, clearly looked at Steve as some sort of poker model to be imitated (and he certainly looked, if not played, the role). Consequently, every single player (save me) went through the process of carefully contemplating every move. A pre-flop fold holding 7-2 required a Solomonic degree of consideration prior to acting. I marveled that these people were even capable of selecting “paper or plastic” at the grocery store check-out.

The other troubling aspect of the game was the overwhelming rake. Winning a hand in the States will set you back 5% of the pot, capped at a maximum of somewhere around $3 to $5 depending on the room (not counting jackpot drop or dealer toke). However, I was never able to get a handle on the rake in this game. Dozens of chips were flying into the pot with each hand, fueled largely by Steve and his $1000-at-a-time re-buys. And each time the dealer dropped so many chips down into the rake box that, near as I could tell, it was amounting to 10% of each pot with no cap.

Generally speaking, a game of this sort simply cannot be beat. The only exceptions are when the players are particularly bad, or the game is particularly loose. And both of these elements were present in this game. When I finally calculated my overall win rate during the entire week of play, it amounted to around $100/hour, a phenomenal rate for a $2/$5 game. How phenomenal? Well, let me put it this way: It’s something I've never achieved before; and I predict that, no matter how long I live, I’ll never see it again.

Most of these earnings actually came at the Aruban poker room at the Excelsior Casino, located at the Holiday Inn resort. The rake there, I discovered by careful enquiry, was an only slightly more reasonable 5% with a $10 cap and $2 jackpot drop.

At this room they had a $4/$8 limit game with an interesting rule variation. In the States, a $4/$8 game would have blinds of $2 and $4, with pre-flop and flop betting increments of $4, and turn/river bets in increments of $8. Here, though, you could choose to bet either $4 on the flop or go straight to $8 a street early.  The math related to this flop bet modification, combined with the aggressive rake, called for an overly tight game.

I experimented with this feature somewhat, although when I discovered that I was consistently betting low with draws and high with made hands, I shifted gears to betting the max on the flop. I had no desire to make myself so easily readable; although at this table I could have played each hand face up and still come away winner.

I pretty much kept my limit play to a minimum, playing only until a seat at the red-chip game opened up. There was so much more money to be made there. Even so, to give an example, I played a 30-minute session at the limit game, buying in for $100 and cashing out for $265.


When I toted up the figures at the end of my Caribbean adventure, I discovered that I had pretty much paid for the hotel, airfare, and meals for the whole trip. I suppose this might just mean that a follow-up visit is called for at some point.

Friday, January 2, 2015

The History of No-Limit Hold 'Em


I guess it takes some audacity for me to claim that I can summarize the entire History of No-Limit Hold ‘Em Poker into a single blog entry. But blogging takes some audacity to begin with, so I suppose I’ll plead guilty as charged. Maybe it will help to say that my own evolution as a poker player mirrors the timeline that I’m about to lay out.

STAGE ONE: 1950s-late 1980s

No one really knows when the first hand of Hold ‘Em was played, or even where. The fact that its full name is “Texas Hold ‘Em” would seem to be a clue regarding the latter. It was definitely being played there by 1959, and within ten years it had spread to Las Vegas. Twenty years after that, it was declared a game of skill by the state of California, and poker rooms throughout that state (which had been spreading draw poker for some time) started spreading that game too. Even to this day, the twin epicenters of Hold ‘em poker are Las Vegas and Los Angeles.

Although poker was legally – and legitimately – determined to be a game of skill, very few players happened to have any. Roughly 99% of all players at this time just played by feel, not really paying attention to which hands are best to hold pre-flop, or when one should fold post-flop. There are still plenty of players who play this way, and you can still find them in pretty much every game. In fact, nearly every poker beginner starts out at this point, and only a few graduate to the next level of skill.

STAGE TWO: Late 1980s-2003

By the time the 80’s were coming to an end, folks started noticing that some players were consistently winning more often than others; i.e., that it wasn’t all just luck after all. The players who were winning had been studying the game, and had figured out that the way to defeat the amateurs was to play a very tight game – folding the overwhelming percentage of the time preflop, and only going to war with the best hands possible. Then, when they did play a hand, bet aggressively to build big pots that they were more likely to win. The strategy even had a name: Tight-aggressive, or TAG. Players like Tom McEvoy, Chris Ferguson, and Phil Helmuth, Jr. were winning world championships with this strategy. T.J. Cloutier became the most successful tournament player in history by using it.

But the seeds of change were being sown, and the TAGs were about to be left behind by a new generation.

STAGE THREE: 2003-Today

The year 2003 was pivotal in Hold ‘em poker. Several significant events happened during this year:
·       A new TV show hit cable television, called the “World Poker Tour”. The show featured (mostly) well-known players playing for millions of dollars, with hidden cameras showing the audience the players’ hole cards. People were finally starting to see some of the strategy behind how winning players played. And since success breeds imitators, the WPT was just the first of over a dozen poker TV shows to hit the networks over the next few years.
·       An anonymous accountant with the serendipitous name of Chris Moneymaker won the World Series of Poker Main Event – poker’s world championship. This fired the imaginations of would-be rounders all over the poker universe. If an amateur like Moneymaker could win the biggest game in poker, maybe they could too.
·       Internet poker started going mainstream. Someone playing online could play more poker in a minute than a live player could play in an hour. Some folks played more hands in just a few months than Doyle Brunson had played in fifty years at the live table.

As the popularity of poker skyrocketed, the TAGs from earlier days saw an opening and began to publish books evangelizing their TAG doctrine. A flood of material from authors like McEvoy, Cloutier, Sklansky, Gordon, and Ciaffone hit the poker universe. The seminal work was probably Dan Harrington’s series, “Harrington on Hold ‘em”. Harrington was himself a world champ, earning the tongue-in-cheek nickname “Action Dan” for his famously tight play. His disciples came to be known as “Harring-bots”. Sayings such as “tight is right” and “fit or fold” started gaining currency.

But behind the scenes, the oh-so-perfect edifice of TAG was beginning to crumble. The culprit? A new strategy, honed to perfection by hordes of internet players: LAG, or “Loose-aggressive”. TAG remains to this day a very effective strategy for cash games, where one has the luxury of sitting around waiting for the very best hands. But it’s suicide in tournaments. Bottom line, you just can’t wait for premium hands in tournaments; the blinds and antes will decimate your stack and make you a non-factor by the time you decide to play something. Consequently, loosening up your opening standards, which increases variance, is mandatory for tournament success. The “aggressive” component of TAG was still relevant in this new strategy. But tight was no longer right; and fit or fold meant failure.

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And this is the path my own personal game has taken. I started off with an understanding of the rules of Hold ‘Em but no idea of strategy (or even an awareness that “strategy” existed). Then I discovered – and read – pretty much every poker book that had been written by the TAG generation, and my game improved correspondingly. But tournament success continued to elude me. I would sit and watch my stack gradually get whittled away, implementing my TAG strategy to perfection. I came to realize that I needed to loosen my game, but wasn’t sure exactly how to do that. It wasn’t until I hired a coach with tournament success of his own that I started to assemble this final piece in my game. It’s definitely made my overall game much more successful … and more fun, too.

Friday, December 19, 2014

Poker and Gambling

Well it’s been six months, I suppose that’s a long enough delay between blog posts. To dip my foot back into the waters, let me describe a situation that always sets me on edge: Whenever I hear poker defined as gambling, especially by people who should know better (like poker pros). It’s not. At least, not by my definition.

Perhaps that’s where the disconnect is. Allow me to define the term my way. “Gambling” to me is putting money at risk when you can have no impact whatsoever on whether you win or lose. The lottery is gambling. Slot machines are gambling. Roulette and Craps are gambling. Keno is definitely gambling … the worse game in the house. In fact, just about everything in the casino is what I would call gambling – you have no impact on the outcome. The only exceptions for me would be Blackjack (if you’re counting cards), Sports betting (but only if you are REALLY studying the game … maybe 2% of all sports betters are good enough to do this), and of course poker. In fact, I think it’s something of a tragedy that poker is generally found in casinos … I end up having to walk past all of this real estate that doesn't interest me in the slightest to get to the small room where I can personally affect my own results.

There’s certainly an element of luck involved in poker, no doubt about it. And that’s actually a good thing. If there wasn't any luck in poker (as Phil Hellmuth, Jr. once astutely observed), the best player would win all of the money and everyone else would lose. But because of the luck factor, sometimes bad players win. And sometimes, they win a lot. And sometimes they win over a long stretch of time, although it’s unlikely that they will. But the best players will lose sometimes … and win more often. And they'll win more when they do win. I've heard some players refer to poker as an “investment”. I don’t think they’re far off.

It’s worth noting that the IRS agrees with my definition, and allows “Professional Poker Player” to be used as a valid employment definition. For this, we owe a debt of gratitude to Billy Baxter, who sued the US and won. The IRS at first would not permit Baxter to identify himself as a professional poker player, a position which would have bumped his tax rate up to around 70%. The judge turned to the prosecutor and said, “Son, if you think poker is a game of luck, let’s have you and Mr. Baxter sit down here with $50,000 and a deck of cards, and just see who wins.”


Enough of an entry for one day … hopefully it won’t be another six months before my next post. Meanwhile, Merry Christmas to one and all!